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Résumé 
Ce texte met en perspective plusieurs interventions directes des autorités monétaires 
françaises sur le marché des changes entre 1924 et 1926. La plus longue d’entre elle 
(juin à octobre 1925) est mise en lumière - à notre connaissance - pour la première fois, 
toutes sont éclairées d’un jour nouveau grâce à l’utilisation de données de change 
journalières et l’exploitation des archives de la Banque de France et du Ministère 
français des Finances.  
L’existence de ces interventions invitent à remettre en cause la vision traditionnelle 
(défendue par la ‘New Economic History’) de l’existence d’un régime de flottement pur 
en France au milieu des années 1920. Toujours sur un plan historique, il ressort que 
l’apprentissage de ce rôle de régulation du marché des changes par les autorités 
monétaires françaises a été fondamentalement perturbé par le fait que les décisions quant 
aux moyens d’action (gager l’or de la Banque de France pour obtenir des crédits en 
devises) engageaient le choix futur d’un régime monétaire. 
Sur un plan économique, l’expérience française des années vingt fait apparaître que le 
concept de crédibilité se révèle central du point de vue de l’efficacité d’une intervention. 
Seule une intervention crédible peut envoyer un effet de signal apte à obtenir un 
renversement d’opinion dominante sur un marché où les cours sont éloignés de leurs 
« valeurs  d’équilibre ».  Cette  crédibilité  a moins trait aux moyens engagés par les 
autorités pour intervenir qu’à la perception de leurs intentions monétaires et financières 
par les opérateurs. 
 
Mots-clé : cours de change, spéculation, Banque de France, Trésor, effet de signal, 
crédibilité, flottement impur.  
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lessons drawn from new evidence 
 
Abstract 
This paper challenges the conventional view of the existence of a pure floating regime in 
France during the mid-1920’s. Our study of the archives of the Bank of France and the 
French Ministry of Finance, as well as a thourough examination of the exchange rates 
(FRF/USD) and (FRF/GBP) during the 1920's reveal that the French authorities did 
intervene on several occasions. How ever from these first direct actions, as well as some 
over abortive attempts, several lessons can be drawn about the effectiveness of 
interventions on a ‘modern’ echange rate market. 
 
 
Keywords:  Exchange rate, Expectations, Speculation, Bank of France, French 
Treasury, Intervention, Dirty floating, Signalling effect, Credibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The classical reference to the work of R. Nurkse invites us to consider that "the post-
war history of the French Franc up to the end of 1926 affords an instructive example of 
completely free and uncontrolled exchange rate variations" (1944, p.117). According to M. 
Friedman, Nurkse really uses this example only to defend his thesis on the potentially 
destabilizing effect of currency speculation. Recently, B. Eichengreen bases his argument on 
the French episode, stating : "A notable feature of post-war international money arrangements 
was the freedom of the float. As a rule, central banks did not intervene in the foreign-
exchange market. The first half of the 1920's thus provides a relatively clean example of a 
floating exchange rate regime"(1996, p.47). For B. Eichengreen,"the French authorities only 
intervened in the exchange market for two months, in the spring of 1924 and during the 
second half of 1926" (1982, p.73). Indeed, these two episodes became well-known following 
J-N Jeanneney's (1976) and J-C Debeir's (1978) publications for the former and the 
publication of  "Souvenirs" by Governor Moreau (1954) for the latter. On the basis of B. 
Eichengreen's statement (1982), as he studies whether or not speculation had a stabilizing or 
destabilizing effect empirically, the hypothesis of the one-to-one relationship between the 
monetary base and exchange rate during the second semester of 1924 and the first semester of 
1926 is made. J.Frenkel (1978), who uses the French example to check the PPP relationship, 
makes exactly the same assumption, he assumes, de facto, an absence of endogeneity in 
variations of the monetary base. 
However, our study of the archives of the Bank of France and the French Ministry of 
Finance, as well as a thourough examination of the exchange rates (FRF/USD) and 
(FRF/GBP) during the 1920's reveals that the French authorities intervened on three other 
occasions ; once between November and December 1924, again from June to October 1925 
and the lastly between May and June 1926. We will here analyse the motives, means and 
consequences of the actions as systematically as possible. Even if these interventions seem to 
be non-sterilized, the fact that the French authorities maintained the stability of nominal 
interest rates to facilitate the sustainability of the public debt, (see G. Makinen and T. 
Woodward (1989)), leads us to bypass their effect on portfolios. However, their direct 
influence on exchange rates can be noted and our attention will be therefore focused on their 
signalling effects (see M. Mussa (1981) and P. Kenen (1987)). 
Far more than contemporary studies, dedicated to interventions during the nineteen 
eighties and nineties, this original contribution encounters the problem of the state secrecy 
surrounding the means of action of the monetary authorities and therefore is an exploratory 
nature. 
However, from these first direct actions, as well as some over abortive attemps, several 
lessons can be drawn about the effectiveness of an action in a forced exchange rate regime in 
a "modern environment". Aftalion (1927), very soon, underlined the key role played by 
speculators in the modification of the market and the importance of new information in the 
formation of exchange rates. He also identified some gregarious behaviour, describing the 
mechanisms of what we today call 'bubbles' or mimicking behaviour. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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From an economic point of view, the French 1920's episode shows that the concept of 
credibility is central when considering the effectiveness of an intervention. Only credible 
intervention can send a signalling effect powerful enough to obtain a reversal of the dominant 
opinion in a market where exchange rates are below their "equilibrium level". This credibility 
depends more on the perception the operators have of the authorities' financial and monetary 
intentions, rather than the means which are actually used. This opinion is shared in 
contemporary papers on the subject (see K. Dominguez and J. Frankel (1993), in particular). 
From a strictly historical perspective, we show that the first of the role of the French 
monetary authorities in the regulation of the foreign-exchange market was fundamentally 
disturbed by the fact that the decisions taken about the means of action to be used, dictated the 
choice of the future monetary regime. Finally, even more fundamentally speaking, the reality 
of these interventions invites us to challenge the conventional view of the existence of a pure 
floating regime in France during the mid-1920's. 
The Institutional context and the first intervention of March 
1924 
At the time, the authorities on the exchange rate policy was bicephalous, with a clear 
asymmetry between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France. Indeed, until the 
Monetary Reform of August 7 1926, the Bank of France was not empowered to intervene in 
the market either directly or alone. In addition, before October 16 1926 it did not have a 
foreign exchange department. If the Bank wanted to intervene it was necessary to get prior 
approval from the Ministry of Finance. This really meant that the decision was governmental 
and therefore took time, given its political nature. More generally speaking, the limits of the 
autonomy of the Bank of France in the post-First World War can be observed. It can 
nonetheless be noted that the Ministry of Finance also needed the Bank of France as it was 
extremely difficult to obtain foreign exchange (necessary for any defensive action), without 
the 'golden-guarantee' of the issuing institution, especially during the period of  the 
depreciation and up until the reversal of the situation in July 1926. Technically speaking, all 
market intervention had to be led by duly mandated commercial banks (at this time, most 
frequently the Banque Lazard, but also Société Générale and Crédit Lyonnais). This deprived 
the authorities of direct contact with effective management of the foreign exchange market.  
The well-known episode of March 1924 illustrates, among other things, the fact that the 
success of  intervention crucially depends on the cooperation between the different parties 
involved in monetary affairs. After two months of procrastination (see R. Philippe (1931) and 
J-N Jeanneney (1976)), those in charge at the Treasury and at the Banque Lazard succeeded in 
convincing Poincaré's government of the validity of an action : the spectre of the collapse of 
the Deutshmark convinced them of the necessity to respond to the offensive of speculation 
against the Franc. The Bank of France agreed to engage part of its gold reserves against two 
loans : one of four million Pounds negotiated on March 9 with four British banks, the other of 
100 million Dollars from the Morgan bank. The latter was subordinated by the French 
government's commitment to press the Senate to adopt a rapid vote for measures of budgetary 
austerity. In this way, the authorities hoped to obtain a lasting reversal of the situation. 
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Fig 1. Source : Statistique journalière, Archives de la Banque de France. 
Intervention began on Monday 10, with only the English loan and a small amount of 
currency at the disposal of the Bank of France. Each morning, bankers and officials from the 
Treasury and the Bank of France conferred and came up with a plan. As shown in figure 1, 
the action taken gave rise to a reversal of the trend from March 12 and March 13, when 
international speculators learnt of the up-coming vote on financial measures and the opening 
of the Morgan loan. In Paris, on Friday, March 14, Sterling and the U.S. dollar were worth 
92.6 FF and 21.5 FF respectively, whereas on Monday 10 they had been worth 111.2  and 
26.9 FF respectively. At the end of the same month, these two currencies were only worth 
78.3 FF and 18.2 FF. The French Franc had regained almost one third of its nominal value. 
Less than half of the Morgan loan had been enough to obtain this result and at the end of 
March the Ministry had already bought back enough currency to pay back two of the English 
loans. The Bank of France used the opportunity to constitute foreign exchange reserves (see 
Jeanneney (1976, p. 190)). The operation was a great success. 
The Deflationary Inspiration of the November-December 
1924 intervention 
In June 1924, the newly appointed Herriot Government (left-coalition) stated its 
intention to continue the deflationary policy with which had been implemented since the 1920 
François-Marsal Convention. To obtain appreciation of the French currency, note ciculation 
had to be maintained under the ceiling of forty one billion Francs. The figure for note 
circulation, published every Thursday, was an indicator of the government's monetary 
credibility. However, as it was also the variable of modification of the government's financial 
policy (through advances obtained from commercial banks) it was going towards the statutory 
limit. In reality, until April 1925, the Bank of France used to falsify its weekly statements to 
conceal the fact that the legal limit had been exceeded. This is the affair of the so-called 
“ false statements ” of the Bank of France (see appendix 1). The confession of this fact would French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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lead to the definitive failure of French Monetary Policy and a loss of all hope for the 
revaluation of the Franc. These facts can be consided as an instance of the type of domination 
of monetary policy by budgetary policy, as described by Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
According to R. Philippe (1931, p.65), of the Banque Lazard, the general secretary of 
the Bank of France A. Aupetit first had the idea of market action in November 1924. As a 
result, the Bank of France could expect a reduction in note circulation. The following 
mechanism was indeed expected : the appreciation of the Franc would have a positive impact 
on public confidence and if it lasted would allow a general decrease in prices via the reduction 
of import prices, furthermore it would incurr a drop in 'monetary demand'. Herriot accepted 
this scheme, he presumably thought it would restore public confidence at a time when his 
government was issuing bonds. In fact, the action began two weeks after the launch of the 
Clementel loan and finished a few days before its close. 



























































































































































































































































































































































Fig 2. Source : Statistique journalière. Archives de la Banque de France. 
The Banque Lazard intervened on behalf of the French monetary authorities from the 
end of  November 1924 essentially by using the Sterling and dollars collected by the Central 
Bank after the March intervention, and without having to use the Morgan funds. Figure 2 
shows the consequences of the operation : Sterling was worth 87.83 FF on November 26 
,whereas by December 2 it had fallen to under 85FF. The Dollar, on the other hand, which had 
been falling slowly, then dropped very dramatically : on November 26 it was worth 18.95FF 
and by December 4 it had dropped to 18.16FF. However, at the beginning of December 
foreign exchange demand grew stronger and stronger as the market clearly intended to take 
advantage of the fall in exchange rates. The Bank of France -lacking the means - had to take 
the decision to stop the operation very quickly from December 12, as Sterling and the Dollar 
were worth what they had been prior to intervention. 
In March 1925, intervention was again contemplated. The idea, this time, came from the 
Minister of Finance, E. Clementel ; according to him the targeted drop in the rates of the French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Dollar and Sterling would allow "a marked remission of the amount of notes in circulation in 
a short time."
1 Deflationary inspiration was the same. Clementel put thirty million dollars at 
the disposal of the Bank of France, fifteen million taken from the Morgan funds and the other 
fifteen million from a recent transfer between the Treasury and the Bank. For the government, 
this was a way of  obtaining a little respite and a way of leaving the scene honorably ; that is, 
if note circulation had effectively dropped below the ceiling. Robineau waited until March 12 
before formulating this request to the Board of the Bank. He did undoubtedly 'dawdle'. The 
next day, the Board noted that confidence in the Franc was lower than it had been in March 
1924. With thirty million dollars, the Bank contended to only be able to contain the 
depreciation of the Franc, and thus such an action could not be justified. The Bank was also 
against a large scale operation  : "the effectiveness of such operations remains always 
uncertain, given that the French Franc is grappling with the interests and strengths of the 
whole world. It is even more doubtful today and will be even more preoccupying, as long as 
the state of the Treasury remains as it is, despite the upcoming issue of a contribution check 
and opinion will  clearly not be oriented towards revaluation of the Franc through the 
governments's budgetary program."
2 On the impulse of Regent Wendel  (member of the 
opposition to the Cartel) the Bank of France now waited patiently for the revelation of its own 
false statements in order to quicken the fall of the Herriot government.  
Exchange rates stabilization by the Treasury  : the June-
October 1925 intervention 
The long operation in the months of June to October 1925, mentioned  for the first time 
in this paper, was the result of a personal initiative taken by the Minister of Finance : J. 
Caillaux.  The Bank of France and the Banque Lazard were not in favour of it and no note of 
recommendation from the Treasury can be found on the subject. The Minister of Finance had 
two goals : naturally to stop the depreciation of the Franc, which had spiralled downward 
since the scandal of the false statements at the beginning of 1925, but furthermore to re-
establish public confidence a few days before the launch of the Caillaux exchange-guarantee 
loan. 
At the beginning of June, the possibility of an operation wherein all the foreign 
exchange at the disposal of the Bank of France and the totality of the Morgan funds would be 
used, was studied.." to not allow domestic or international speculation to operate in an empty 
market where offers are lacking "
3. However, an incident between Caillaux and those in 
charge at the Bank of France, put pay to this plan. According to Philippe, the Bank of France 
was alerted by the Lazard Bank of mounting tension vis a vis the Franc in New York and 
refused to act, arguing that they did not have ministerial backing. It is said that in a state of 
anger, Caillaux uttered the following to Governor Robineau " I testify that from this day 
forward I will bestow my services to ensure this defence and I am resigned to do so without 
your approval". 
                                                 
1 Archives de la Banque de France, lettre de Clémentel à Robineau en date du 4 mars 1925, Procés verbal du Conseil 
Général, séance du 12 mars 1925. 
2  Archives de la Banque de France, lettre de Robineau à Clémentel, Procés verbal du Conseil général, séance du 13 mars 
1925. 
3  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 32351, lettre de la banque Lazard frères & Cie à Caillaux, en date du 8 juin 1925. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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From the last week of June, the Treasury, therefore, sold its currency (over 1.3 million 
Sterling and more than 1.3 milion Dollars ) without being able, however, to stop the Franc's 
depreciation : as shown in figure 3, Sterling reached a maximum of 108.55 Francs on July 1. 
It is without doubt that the announcement of the vote to increase note circulation by 6 billion 
on June 27, had a very negative effect on the exchange rate of the Franc. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry continued. Table 1, which relates purchases and sales of foreign exchange perfomed 
by the Treasury, shows that between June and October, the Lazard Bank not only bought 
currency (as it had done since the end of the First World War) which allowed the Treasury to 
cope with repayments of the foreign debt, but it also sold Sterling and Dollars in attempt to 
stabilize the exchange rate of the Franc. 
TABLE 1: Foreign exchange purchases and sales on behalf of the Treasury in 1925 
(thousands) 
 STERLING  DOLLAR 
        
 Purchases  Sales  Purchases  Sales 
       
January 525    4  350   
February 440    900   
March       
April 745      
May 2  370      
June  3 567  1 386  4 501  1 346 
July  5 042  1 364  9 257  119 
August  2 005  3 730  1 448  85 
September  5 121  3 285  5 348  537 
October  1 024  6 950  1 150  2 001 
November 905    2  950   
December  2 749  976  6 337   
       
Total  24 494  17 662  35 833  4 088 
        
Source : Archives Economiques et Financières, B 32351, Ministère des Finances. 
It can be observed in July 1925, that while purchases were almost four times higher than 
sales, the trend was then reversed : from July 3, the Pound dropped to 103.47 F. Had all the 
means of action possible been used at the beginning of July ? Had the authorities given a 
strong market signal ? Had operators expected that the monetary authorities had the firm 
intention of controlling the external value of the Franc, and that it would therefore pay back, 
per contra, the Francs supplied on the market, from that moment on ? In any case, the rates 
did remain relatively stable until the end of September, Sterling swung between 102F and 
105F and the Dollar between 21F and 21.5F. This was the result of engaging 3 700 000 
Pounds in August and 3 825 000 Pounds in September, the amount of Dollars used was lesser. 
The fact that sales of currency were higher than purchases may reveal the existence of a 
market 'pressure' leading to the Franc's decline. No more can be said about this, given the 
available data. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Fig 3. Source : Statistique journalière. Archives de la Banque de France. 
During 1925, even if some purchases were motivated by stategic considerations, (that is 
to take advantage of the circumstances to constitute foreign exchange reserves in order to 
better channel looming tensions), the fact that the Treasury needed foreign exchange in the 
post-War period was an additional factor in the Franc's depreciation. In 1925 alone, 35 million 
Dollars and almost 35 million Pounds were absorbed in this way. 
From October 1, after three months of stability, the Franc suffered a dramatic 
depreciation in a wholly spectacular fashion. Whereas, on October 1, Sterling and the Dollar 
were worth 102.3F and 21.12F respectively, on October 14, these currencies had already 
reached 107.46F and 22.22F and by the 28
th they stood at 116.9F and 24.02F. How can such a 
sudden and substantial drop be explained ? 
Sicsic (1992) suggests that it is linked to the failure of the Caillaux loan which had had 
an effect from mid-September on. It may also be observed that the Franc's decline coincides 
perfectly with the unsuccessful conclusion of Franco-American negotiations over debt. The 
latter were made public on October 2, following the rejection of Caillaux's proposals. Without 
financial approval from the U.S., the perspective of monetary stabilization was rapidly 
disappearing. It seems that, from that moment on, nothing could stop the decline of the French 
Franc. 
Seven million pounds Sterling were sold, but the Treasury was still unable to stop the 
Franc from spiralling : there was only a very short respite from October 7 to October 9 (see 
figure 3). During the first two weeks of October, the Treasury used up the totality of the 
foreign exchange it had accumulated during the summer. If the difference between total 
purchases (16 759 999 Pounds) and total sales (16 716 768 Pounds) carried out between June 
and October is calculated, it can be seen that the positve balance was only 43 231 Pounds. 
This clearly shows that the Treasury had committed all the reserves of currency which had French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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been collected during this period. As reserves were depleting rapidly, the Treasury considered 
using the Morgan funds, which had not yet been touched. 
Caillaux clearly was ready to use the latter if necessary : in June, he had already given 
instructions to the Treasury so as to make sure early of the liquidity of the amounts available. 
This premature request, confirms that intervention was the Minister's personal initiative. In 
August, whereas Moret deplored the low yield obtained from these funds, Caillaux once again 
stated his request for liquidity. "As the Minister has decided to maintain the liquidity of the 
Morgan funds in order to be able to act if intervention in the exchange market was necessary, 
the Treasury has to take this consideration into account while trying to invest the fund as well 
as possible"
4.  
At the beginning of October, Painlevé (the Prime Minister at the time) contacted the 
Bank on this subject "given the current trend in the exchange market, I think the time has 
come to use a first instalment (tranche) of 10 million dollars"
5. The proposal did not get 
approval. Robineau stated his reservations to the General Council of the Bank : "in the present 
circumstances, the Council would undoubtedly not have taken the initiative to suggest such an 
intervention, which would demand, it thought, much greater contingents, given the seasonal 
requirements of the market and the exceedingly preoccupying state of the Treasury. It 
apprehends seeing successive instalments of exchange rates reserves being spent, reserves 
which have protected the market from foreign speculation for the past eighteen months, and 
which it seems imperative to conserve. It can however, only defer to governmental 
decisions"
6. If the operation were to fail, the government alone would be responsible for it. 
However, on October 9, Painlevé ordered the Bank of France to transfer ten million Dollars, 
drawn on the Morgan Funds, to the Lazard Bank in New York. A letter, from Caillaux to 
Robineau, dated October 12, confirmed this transfer. In reality, however, this amount was not 
used. The operation was stopped in circumstances which still remain unclear. The mounting 
lack of confidence in the Franc may have led the Minister to deem its committment 
unnecessary : the Cabinet was also in the grip of internal political conflict. 
The May-June 1926 Intervention: difference of opinion 
between the Treasury and the Bank of France is 
exacerbated. 
The Treasury held sole responsibilty for the intervention in May-June 1926. In a memo 
dated May 5 1926, Moret warned of the dangers linked to the Franc's sustained depreciation, 
which had been going on for the past few months. The acceleration of this decline was fuelled 
by the general rise in prices, the cost of which would become extremely high. Inflation first 
threatened the fragile equilibrium of the budget, owing to the increase in expenditure it would 
cause later. There was also a factor of social discontent, demands for higher wages were 
giving rise a situation of mounting tension. Furthermore, the Franc's total collapse was to be 
avoided. The experience of the Deutschmark in 1922-1923 still haunted memories. The 
Director of the Treasury. in particular, expressed his concern that " the exchange rates of these 
last few days and data obtained from various market sources may lead us to expect a climate 
                                                 
4  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, note pour le Ministre n°7281, signé par Moret en date du 27 août 1925. 
5  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, lettre de Painlevé à Robineau en date du 8 octobre 1925.  
6  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, lettre de Robineau à Painlevé en date du 8 octobre 1925. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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of panic which would give rise to even sharper drops if the Government does not intervene 
and decide on immediate market action"
7. Moret did not conceal his reservations on the 
success of such an operation to the Minister, given the extreme lack of confidence in the 
Franc. The Dollars in the Morgan fund alone would not suffice and according to Moret it 
would be imperative for the Bank of France to secure part of its gold reserves against loans 
from the Federal Bank. 
Péret immediately approached the Bank of France and warned : "the circumstances 
seem to justify short-term intervention"
8. At the same time, the Minister of Finance demanded 
that the Bank of France make the dollars from the Morgan funds, which belonged to the 
Treasury, available. This occurred on May 10. On the same day, he expressed the possibility 
of  using part of the Central Bank's cash reserves as security. The Morgan funds would be 
insufficient and it was going to be necessary to obtain new loans in foreign exchange. Péret 
first spoke of 100 million Dollars and then of 150 million Dollars (May 20 1926). While, for 
the Minister, this was essentially a defensive measure, it was also meant to lastingly restore 
confidence in assets denominated in French Francs. The committment of foreign loans 
secured against the gold reserves of the bank would constitute a strong signal which would 
squeeze currency speculation to a point where it would no longer be necessary to use the 
foreign currency and hence the gold reserves. Later, it would open the way to structural 
measures... 
The Bank's reaction was violent and negative. It emphasized the problem of lack of 
volume effect against the potential importance of the signalling effect. In a first letter, dated 
May 6, addressed to the Ministry, the Bank underlined that using the Treasury's dollars would 
only give short-term respite, and greater action would be unrealistic given the great lack of 
public confidence which prevailed in the Franc. There was, therefore, no need to obtain 
foreign loans, particularly if the Bank of France had to commit its gold reserves to do so : "the 
Board still believes that such a measure is dangerous and should be discearded as a threat to 
confidence in the currency, the preservation of which has always been a priority’’
9. The Bank 
believed the outcome of the intervention would be negative and as a result it would be unable 
to pay back the short-term loans to which it had subscribed. It would not be able, therefore, to 
get back its gold, which was to constitute a predjudice the day the Franc recovered its gold-
convertibility. 
For the Bank of France, only the return of public confidence would allow the Franc to 
appreciate. In spite of that, the Minister of Finance thought that, if the Bank could be moraliy 
and technically involved in the first operations with the dollars of the Morgan funds, it would 
be brought eventually to lend 'its gold' and thus perpetuate the first results. On May 19, at the 
Elysée Palace, Robineau, Rothschild and Wendel acknowledged that the commitment of the 
Morgan Dollars, which did not belong to the Bank, could not be opposed. Briand and Péret 
purposefully recorded : "the assent must be given by the Bank of France to use the Morgan 
funds, insinuating that without that assent they would never assume responsibilty for even 
short-term intervention’’
10. Péret must have thought that once the Bank became part of the 
operation, it would follow. The very next day, he wrote to Robineau : "using the Morgan 
                                                 
7  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, note pour le ministre en date du 5 mai 1926. 
8  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, lettre de Péret à Robineau en date du 5 mai 1926. 
9  Archives de la Banque de France, Procés verbal du Conseil Général, séance du 11 mai 1926. 
10  Archives de la Banque de France, compte rendu de la réunion tenue le 19 mai 1926 à l’Elysée, annexe au Procés verbal du 
conseil général de la séance du 20 mai 1926. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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funds could only obtain insufficient results and leave us ill-equipped to cope with the 
inevitable reaction which follows any intervention. It is, therefore, imperative that additional 
means be obtained, as quickly as possible, for  our currency to be saved’’
11. On May 20, the 
Bank had still not given in.  
The operation did in fact begin on May 21 in the afternoon. Figure 4 shows that the 
Franc rose in a spectacular way from May 20 : on May 19 Sterling and the Dollar were worth 
170.8 and 35.11 Francs respectively, the following day they had fallen to 163 and 33.5 
Francs. Jeanneney (1976) states one of Wendel's opinions, according to which, the Lazard 
Brothers in association with the Maison Louis-Dreyfus would have taken a position towards 
the Franc a few days earlier. Desiring to make profit, they would have committed foreign 
exchange (their own) from May 20 onwards. However, this is not proven, a letter from Lazard 
Brothers, dated May 22, seems to suggest the contrary. It reveals that the Lazard Bank was 
doubtful of the success of the intervention :"indeed, we should not, at any time, dissimulate 
the difficulty of the task and we remain convinced that even if the operation is entered into 
with all the necessary guarantees, its success can still not be seen as certain."
12 So the Bank 
Lazard regarded the failure of the operation as probable and was already careful to deny all 
responsibility. Why, therefore, in such circumstances would it have taken position ? 
The appreciation of the Franc was certainly more likely to have been the result of 
expectations by certain 'well informed' agents, wise to massive up-coming intervention in the 
exchange market. The exceptional meeting, held at the Elysée Palace on May 19, reminds us 
of the counter-offensive of March 1924. Moreover, on May 20, a government communiqué 
announcing that it intended to use all the resources at its disposal, was released. This news 
could also have influenced expectations. 
Whatever the reason, the first results were positive (see figure 4). On May 26, Sterling 
and the Dollar were worth 149.5 and 30.8 Francs respectively (whereas on May 19, thay had 
reached 170.8 and 35.1 Francs). To obtain such a result it had been necessary to commit 35 
million dollars on the market. The Morgan funds were therefore exhausted very rapidly and it 
became necessary to find a new means of action. However, the Bank of France maintained its 
position, despite repeated requests by Peret and Briand. 
                                                 
11  Archives de la Banque de France, lettre de Péret à Robineau, Procès verbal du conseil général, séance du 20 mai 1926. 
12  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, lettre de la banque Lazard à Péret en date du 22 mai 1926. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Fig 4. Source : Statistique journalière. Archives de la Banque de France. 
On May 27 and 28, the time came to take a decision, Moret wrote : "the balances carried 
forward on foreign currency are tightening incessantly : they are currently attaining 13 Francs 
for one Pound on three months, which means 35 % per annum. It is not surprising that the 
franc is being sold short  more and more and in such conditions a certain release in the 
exchange market may be expected’’
13. Expectations on the French Franc were still pessimistic 
(foreign currency was still being carried over), operators were still borrowing francs short 
term, hoping to pay them back once the franc would have depreciated again. For Moret, 
strong intervention, provoking additional appreciation of the franc, would "bear squeeze" 
speculators and lead to a reversal of the situation as it had in March 1924. 
The Pound and the Dollar were stable at around 150 Francs and slightly over 30 Francs 
respectively. The Lazard Bank also felt that stopping action at this point would have 
extremely serious consequences and that it was absolutely necessary to obtain the support of 
the Bank of France. The Treasury appealed yet again, but to no avail. 
After having "dumped" over half the Morgan funds onto the market and faced with the 
fact that it could no longer obtain new currency, the Lazard Bank stopped all action on June 3. 
However, at the Ministry of Finance all hope had not been lost. During  a meeting with 
Robineau and Briand on June 5, Péret told the Governor that the newly formed Board of 
experts, had voted unaminously, minus two votes (one of which was that of the vice-governor 
of the Bank, P. Ernest-Picard), in favour of the Bank committing its gold reserves. A few days 
later, on June 14 to be exact, a quarrel broke out between the members of the Board : Rist 
insisted that a motion be voted for the bank to deliver its gold reserves, Ernest-Picard was 
against and threatened to resign. 
                                                 
13  Archives Economiques et Financières, B 33198, note pour le ministre en date du 28 mai 1926. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Left to itself, the Franc depreciated yet again : on June 8 Sterling and the Dollar were 
already worth 163.7 and 33.4 Francs respectively and by June 14 they had attained 173.4 and 
35.6 Francs. Peret had not managed to turn the situation around. He resigned from office on 
June 15, regretting not having been able to find support from the Bank of France. 
Economic lessons, the importance of credibility was 
already apparent   
In a floating exchange rate regime, intervention on the part of the monetary authorities 
is meant, either to smoothe short-term fluctuations on the foreign exchange market or to bring 
about a trend reversal in a situation judged as ever more irrational by looking to correct 
market perceptions. During the nineteen twenties, interventions were not aimed at reducing 
the excessive volatility of exchange rates. At the time, this was not a structural factor in the 
reduction of social well-being. They were used by the French authorities to curb the 
prolonged decline of the Franc, ('leaning against the wind'). Thus, firstly, the strength of the 
'tempest ' must be gauged by briefly analyzing the features of the dynamics of the exchange 
market between 1924 and July 1926. 
The period is dominated by financial constraints which weighed heavily on the French 
government (see R.M. Haig (1929)). The policy of fixing interest rates - in order to facilitate 
the management of the public debt - made money supply endogenous to the demand for 
public bonds (see Makinen and Woodward (1989)). In a context where fiscal uncertainty was 
lessened (paradoxically a capital levy was never introduced under the left-coalition), this 
demand basically depend on the real yield of the bonds, that is to say inflationary 
expectations. With fixed nominal interest rates, the price level was undetermined : its value 
was dependent only on the expectations concerning its future evolution. Modifications in 
these involve a variation in the general level of prices and, therefore, expectations were self-
fulfiling. On this basis, it seems that intervention on the foreign exchange market could be 
successful if and only if it managed to provoke a lasting reversal of price expextations through 
its signalling effect. 
Was this really the intention of the French monetary authorities ? 
If on two occasions (March 1924 and May 1926) the monetary authorities agreed on the 
necessity to intervene to avoid the Franc following the downward path of the Deutschmark 
and each time they did maintain the hope of a lasting reversal of expectations in the exchange 
market, we have to note, however, that more often they had circumstantial objectives and 
were really only waiting for some respite. 
In November 1924, the Bank of France wished to lower the figure of note circulation, at 
a time when it may have still seemed possible to cover up the scandal of the 'false statements' 
(the Bank no longer wanted to do this in March 1925, as it intended using the affair to bring 
down the Herriot government). As far as the Ministry of Finance was concerned, its main 
intention was to reverse the dynamics of the foreign exchange market to improve its financial 
situation on a temporary basis : it wanted either to ensure the success of a loan as at the end of 
1924 or during the summer of 1925 or hinder the growth of the nominal value of 
administrative expenditure, as in May 1926. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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On account of the limited motivations and the pursuit of certain individual personal 
interests, the French monetary authorites did not consider the credibility of their defensive 
actions, that is to say the context in which would be operating, its compatibilty with the 
monetary and financial environment of the time or more precisely, of the way in which the 
market perceived the French situation. 
The three interventions of November 1924, June 1925 and May 1926 were effective in 
the very short-term, as the authorities managed to turn the trend of the market around for a 
few days or even for a few weeks. It can be noted however that, both the effect of surprise and 
the secrecy which surrounded these actions were reduced. The political nature of the decision 
and the intermediation of commercial banks favoured the announcement to a few "initiated" 
individuals a few days before. On several occasions, an official communiqué forewarned the 
public of pending intervention. On the basis of the existence of asymmetric information 
between the authorities and the market, the traders presumably anticipated a change of tactics 
in French economic policy. If ,in principle, the concept of credibility articulates the means, 
the effects and the context, we do have to underline that this capacity to provisionally reverse 
the depreciation of the Franc does not seem to be linked to the means employed : in May-June 
almost all the Morgan funds were used without success whereas in March 1924 less than half 
had been enough to obtain a reversal of expectations ; and during the summer of 1925 very 
few means were used to obtain respite. Contemporary studies on the subject all reach the 
same conclusion. (see namely K. Dominguez and J.Frankel (1993)). 
In the long term, these interventions were ineffective, as nothing changed the market 
perception ,albeit incorrect, of the fundamentals of the French economy. The authorities did 
not send any other signals destined to reassure traders : no increase in fiscal pressure, no 
reduction of public expenditure, and, above all, no will to put any inclusive and coherent plan 
to stabilize the Franc. Besides, and more precisely, this sequence of signals had ensured the 
success of the operation in March 1924. The detailed chronology of this episode shows that it 
was more the announcement of the setting up of a programme to reequilibrite public finances 
rather than that of intervention which permitted the reversal of expectations. Indeed, the 
episode of stabilization also puts things into perspective, underlining the importance of 
interventions for the reversal of expectations. The policy of stabilization proposed by the 
Board of experts at the beginning of July 1926 (object of a broad consensus amongst 
economists and politicians) considered that obtaining foreign loans so as to guarantee the 
stability of exchange rates by direct intervention in the foreign exchange market was essential 
(the figure of 100 million dollars was announced, but at the beginning of August Moret 
thought that twice the amount would be necessary). As a matter of fact, the change in regime 
during the summer of 1926, was so transparent and credible (see T.J. Sargent (1983) and R, 
Dornbusch (1989)) and the inflow of capital was so great that the Poincare government did 
not need to use this currency and that the intervention which began in December 1926 and 
continued until June 1928 had the objective of avoiding too greater an appreciation of the 
Franc. (see K. Mouré (1998)). 
Taking the French experience as an example, it seems that interventions do not play a 
major role in the the process of reversal of expectations. They can only be effective when 
accompanied by monetary and budgetary measures.  It can also be seen that the French 
authorities way of learning to deal with the management of exchange rates was hesitant : 
motivation was unclear and neither the timing nor the credibility of actions were envisaged. 
The novelty of the economic phenomena at stake and the specificity of the historic 
circumstances can partially explain these prevarications. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Lessons of history: the weight of uncertitude surrounding 
the stabilization of the Franc and the impure nature of a 
floating regime. 
When put into perspective, it can be seen from the four defensive actions we have 
studied, that co-operation, -even when it was in some cases imposed- between poles of the 
monetary authority (Minister and director of the Treasury on one side, the Bank of France on 
the other) constituted the prerequisite for the success of an intervention, even if it did not 
guarantee it. The perennial state of discord beetween the monetary powers under the left-
coalition represented a factor of uncertitude which was harmful for the credibility of the 
action. The repeated failure to halt the fall of the Franc certainly constituted a factor which 
aggravated the exchange rate crisis in the spring of 1926. In fact, the disagreement on the 
possibility of intervention conceals far greater divergence on the choice of a monetary regime 
for France. When Keynes, as a conclusion to his open letter to the French Minister of Finance 
in January 1926, asks the question "is there any sufficient objection to using the gold in the 
Bank of Franc to anchor the Franc exchange ?"(1926,p.23), he knew that since the publication 
of Tract on Monetary Reform he was practically alone in  defending the thesis of superiority 
of the forced exchange rate regime over the Gold Standard and that in France the question of 
the Issuing Institution commitment of its gold reserves was truly at the centre of monetary 
debate. 
If, after the war, perfect consensus among the monetary authorities prevailed on the 
introduction of a deflationary policy allowing the return of former parity between the Franc 
and gold, from mid-1922, in the face of Germany's proven financial weakness and the ever-
increasing difficulty to support the National debt, the Treasury denounced the chimeric nature 
of such an action. Treasury called for a more realistic monetary policy that is to say, a 
stabilization-devaluation of the national currency. Until 1926, the Treasury was in open 
conflict with the Bank of France (which remained in favour of the revaluation of the Franc). 
The Bank's gold, essential for forceful intervention in the exchange market did not have the 
same importance for the two institutions. For the Bank of France committing its reserves 
would jeopardize the future revaluation of the Franc ; it was unable to dissociate the Gold 
Standard principle of stability from the issue of the level of 'metallic' definition of the Franc. 
For the Treasury, which had accepted the idea of lowering the gold value of the Franc, the 
loss of gold was not really a problem. The French monetary authorities' failure to bear 
squeeze expectations cannot be dissociated from their divergences on the future definition of 
the 'metallic' value of the Franc. As from the end of the month of June 1926, men who 
supported the idea of stabilization-devaluation of the Franc were at the head of the Bank, 
French monetary intentions became clearer and stabilization more credible. The market was 
then ready to swing its opinion. 
To conclude, we must obviously emphasise that the existence of these actions in the 
foreign exchange-market leads us to reconsider the hypothesis of exogeneity of the monetary 
base in France in the mid-1920's and leads us to to reject the conventional view of the 
existence of a perfectly pure floating regime at this period. These interventions should not be 
overlooked and the French Franc is not as it is traditionally presented, the archetype of a 
floating currency. By the same token, surely, this French episode calls for a more detailed 
examination of the behaviour of other European central banks during the period ? French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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Finally, these interventions can be re-introduced into the Nurkse/Friedman debate on the 
stabilizing or destabilizing nature of speculation. As they did, in fact, revealed the discord 
between monetary authorities and their inability to control the economic situation, they had 
the counter-productive effect of bringing into the open the absence of anchorage for 



























































































































































































































































































































Source : Archives Economiques et Financières, B 18675, Ministère des Finances. French Exchange Rate Management in the mid-1920's 
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